This is yet another essay in "theories and methods," or, as I would prefer, "approaches to the study of religion." It deals with the role of "semantics" in the study of religion, but that can be approached from two different angles, at least. On the one hand, we might be interested in what sort of semantic model researchers should deploy in studying the beliefs and practices of individuals and religious communities. On the other, we might be interested in the sort of model yielded by the study of religious language. These need not be the same. A. J. Ayer famously brought a verificationist model to the first, from which he concluded that the second yielded no model at all, because religious language was nonsense. This paper will argue that the same model works well for both, but that the division of language within some religious communities has led to a good deal of confusion.
Semantics and the Study of Religion
This is yet another essay in "theories and methods," or, as I would prefer, "approaches to the study of religion." It deals with the role of "semantics" in the study of religion, but that can be approached from two different angles, at least. On the one hand, we might be interested in what sort of semantic model researchers should deploy in studying the beliefs and practices of individuals and religious communities. On the other, we might be interested in the sort of model yielded by the study of religious language. These need not be the same. A. J. Ayer famously brought a verificationist model to the first, from which he concluded that the second yielded no model at all, because religious language was nonsense. This paper will argue that the same model works well for both, but that the division of language within some religious communities has led to a good deal of confusion.
Having committed myself to discussing semantics, I'm duty-bound to admit that I plan to eliminate the term from the body of my argument. In a discussion of "Kripke models," in the logic of tenses, John Burgess writes that:
In the literature, one often finds instead the phrase "Kripke semantics." Since "semantics" is a term already in use by linguists for a theory of meaning, it is important to note that Kripke models were not and are not intended to provide a theory of the meaning of tenses and temporal distinctions (or moods or modal distinctions) in natural languages like English . . . it is best just to avoid "semantics" altogether. (Burgess 2009, 20) I think Burgess's caveat is well-taken, and that this will prove to be of particular importance in what follows. So unless otherwise required, I will confine myself to taking about theories of meaning, or just meaning.
Here's another point to get on the table. If humans didn't have a certain kind of hardware, based on a certain evolutionary development, they would not be able to learn language. Most human infants progress from naturally emitted noises to mimicry to the production of recognizable sentences sometime within their first three years of life. The move from mimicry to sentences takes place under the tutelage of at least one other language-user, who interacts with the infant using her own idiolect. By idiolect I mean nothing more than the unique way of speaking of a single individual. Donald Davidson has argued that it is misleading to think of language from the top down.(see Davis 2012, 108ff) Rather, the individuals in the immediate environment of the toddler contribute bits of linguistic behavior that eventually come to make up its grammar, pronunciation, and vocabulary. These idiolects make up a dialect. So, for example, on a recent trip to the doctor I asked a new nurse if I detected a bit of New Jersey in her voice. "No," she said, "Brooklyn, but I have a sister on Staten Island and another in Jersey." When I told this story to a local barmaid, who happens to have a very broad south Jersey accent, she replied, "oh yeah, they got a very thick accent up there." In a natural language there is similar diversity in grammar and vocabulary. Thus, to be a speaker of a natural language is simply to have an idiolect sufficiently similar to others for them to call your dialect theirs.
This point is worth making because linguists and cognitive scientists often write as if language were a function of brain processes. But while I'm perfectly happy to admit that proper neurological functioning is essential to language learning, language doesn't begin in the brain. It begins when verbal behavior begins to modify instinct and becomes more or less full-blown 3 habit. Members of a group begin to use verbal behavior to make and modify plans toward a shared end. A sure sign of language, I suppose, is the emergence of the counterfactual, as in "if we had done that, maybe the elephant wouldn't have been able to crush Manny and Jack."
Neither linguists nor cognitive scientists, nor anyone else, have access to that proto-languageusing moment; they have little or nothing to say about how or when verbal behavior became meaningful behavior.(see Davis forthcoming)
Meaning and Truth
In the fourth book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle notes that "to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true." (Aristotle 1984 (Aristotle , 1011b Two millennia later Alfred Tarski began with Aristotle's characterization and produced the following instantiation of it:
`it is snowing' is a true sentence if and only if it is snowing.(Tarski 1956, 156)
On Tarski's development, this captures Aristotle's point and "its intuitive meaning and general intention seem to be quite clear and intelligible."(ibid. 155) After all, what else could make the sentence true? Tarski goes on to develop from this a technical account of the concept of truth in formalized languages that "resulted in the creation of a branch of mathematical logic known as model theory. This fact alone," write Alexis and John Burgess, "makes Tarski's work an enduring achievement." (Burgess & Burgess 2011, 16) They go on to illustrate the formal structure of arithmetic in as much detail as needed for most philosophical purposes, distinguishing object-language from meta-language, and laying out "a recursive definition sufficient to determine, step by step, the truth values of more and more complex sentences."(ibid., 26) All of this based on rules for producing ever more complex iterations of "x" is true if and only iff x.
It is worth noting that "Tarski finds a philosophical reason for not taking the notion of truth as a primitive in a view call `physicalism' current in his day among the positivistically inclined. According to this view, the only scientifically admissible primitives are logical and physical."(ibid., 21) The implications of this rigorism will complicate the story when, some 30 years after Tarski, Donald Davidson deploys his work to solve a dispute between Quine and Strawson on meaning. Davidson maintains that if we can get a general account of what it is to know a language, we will have answered any reasonable demands on understanding "meaning."
These conditions are three: There must be a grammar, there must be an account of meaning and there must be a finite number of primitives out of which an indefinite number of well-formed sentences may be constructed. But this turns out to have been done already by Tarski. Thus "John loves Mary" is true if and only if John loves Mary. "Mary is kind" is true only if Mary is kind. Add a basic operation for conjunctions and you get "John loves Mary because Mary is kind" is true if and only if John loves Mary because Mary is kind. "Though no doubt relativized to times, places, and circumstances," writes Davidson, "the kind of structure required seems either identical with or closely related to the kind given by a definition of truth along the lines first expounded by Tarski, for such a definition provides an effective method for determining what every sentence means (i.e. gives the conditions under which it is true)." (Davidson 1965, 8) Many critics take Davidson to task over the formal mechanisms of his approach (see Burgess & Burgess 2011, chap. 6 ), but the broader philosophical issues revolve around the "definition" of truth and the relation of truth to meaning. On the latter, Davidson repeatedly attempts to make clear that the only sense of meaning he is interested in is the relation of our sentences to "the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false." (Davidson 1974, 198) There might be reasons of various sorts why Mary is kind -her upbringing, the influence of a professor, witnessing the cruelty of another -but "Mary is kind" is true only if Mary is kind. What else could make the sentence true? "Truth" has no epistemic work to do.
As for providing a definition of truth, Davidson comes to see the very idea as wrongheaded. By the end of his career he has broken from Tarski and come to treat "truth" as a primitive:
We should not say that truth is correspondence, coherence, warranted assertability, ideally justified assertability, what is accepted in the conversation of the right people, what science will end up maintaining, what explains the success of science or of our ordinary beliefs. To the extent that realism and antirealism depend on one or another of these views of truth we should refuse to endorse either. (Davidson 1988, 190-191) Truth, thinks Davidson, is more limpid than any of the proposed analyses. We should stick with Aristotle rather than allow ourselves to be tempted down byways we know to be dead ends. All this would seem to place Davidson among the "deflationists," who maintain that "true", as a predicate applied to sentences or propositions, isn't doing any substantive work. Burgess & Burgess distinguish between moderate and radical deflationists. Quine counts as a moderate because he considers "true" to be a genuine predicate; Ramsey is a radical, for treating it as simply redundant. (Burgess & Burgess 2011, chap. 3) But Davidson, although sympathetic, is not willing to go along. Invoking Aristotle once again, he does "not think we can understand meaning or any of the propositional attitudes without the concept of truth." (Davidson 1996, 33) Suppose I say "I believe that Murphy is younger than I am." If I am correct in my belief then
Murphy is younger than I am. But the only thing that can make a belief correct is for the object of that belief to be true. In in this case, the object of my belief is "Murphy is younger than I am," 6 and that is true if and only if Murphy is younger than I am. How I confirm that is another matter.
Having and understanding beliefs, desires, hopes, fears and the like requires a concept of truth.
In fact, as Davidson puts it, "I confess I do not see how, if truth is an assertability condition, and knowing the assertability conditions is understanding, we can understand a sentence without having a concept of truth."(ibid.) Learning this concept of truth is not difficult. As Davidson puts it in various places, it begins as soon as a child becomes aware that it is possible to make a mistake, for at that point he begins to learn that if he makes an error in applying a term, he will not successfully be able to go on. "Once trial and error (from the teacher's point of view) is replaced with thought and belief (from the learner's point of view), the concept of truth has application." (Davidson 1997, 14) So, by the end of his career, Davidson has rejected Tarski's quasi-positivist rigorism about primitive terms and takes "truth" as in need of no explanation or definition beyond the basic characterization given be Aristotle. Furthermore, he has also come to believe that everything that might legitimately be desired from a theory of meaning can be gleaned from what Tarski did with Aristotle's characterization. Now it remains to see how any of this has an impact on the study of religion.
Religion, Language, and Truth
I've always wanted a Dogon statue. The sculpture plays an important role, not only in Dogon daily life, but in the complex religious symbolism first laid out by Marcel Griaule and his team beginning in the 1940s. I first encountered one in a small gallery in Greenwich Village when I was first studying Griaule's work, back in the 1970s. It was, as I remember, $500, which was too much for a graduate student. Today I can find a wide variety of Dogon art online, from a couple of dozen dollars to many thousands, but many look unused, which probably means 7 carved for resale. Why does this matter? I want one that was actually part of the mythic and ritual life of the Dogon and this would normally involve a patina of sacrificial blood and grain.
In a scene well-known to my students, a camera pans around a courtyard where a Dogon sculptor is finishing up a piece. Satisfied, he sets it on the ground and picks up a barnyard animal (a small goat, I think), slits its throat, and sprinkles the blood on the statue, along with some grain.(Goberman & Bauman 1988) As Walter van Beek puts it, "without sacrifice a statue would be a simple baga (piece of wood); with sacrifice it is a dege, the Dogon term for protective statue." (van Beek 1988, 60) While I value the design and the sculptural values of the baga, what I want is a dege. I have a good reason to believe that a particular piece of wood is a dege if there is evidence that it has regularly received sacrificial offerings. These sacrificial materials become part of the dege and it would be of value to me to know that my particular example was part of a living religious practice and not just a piece of sculpture. This is irrelevant to the value it has to the Dogon. In fact, as van Beek goes on to say, "statues fade out of the religious system . . . These days they are almost always sold to tourists or art merchants. As these dege have lost their function and are only relics of a forgotten past, their sale entails no consequences for the Dogon religion."(ibid., 64) In other words, the Dogon believe that these statues hold a place in their institutions that depends upon a wide variety of other beliefs, about gods and spirits, about the cosmic origins of their individual clans and families, and about the circulation of powers within their cosmos.
And at least some Dogon, based on van Beek's report, continue to maintain these beliefs.
For he notes that, "the prices for statues have risen so high as to incite people to steal ones that are still in use; that is an entirely different matter."(ibid.) If nobody thought that dege were 8 efficacious, then it would not be clear why it made any difference. But if that is true, then there are likely to be at least some who believe that:
Originally, at the creation, the earth was pure. The lump flung by God was of pure clay.
But the offence of the jackal defiled the earth and upset the world-order. That is why the Nummo came down to reorganize it. The earth which came down from Heaven was pure earth, and wherever it was put, it imparted its purity to the spot and to all the ground that was cleared. Wherever cultivation spread, impurity receded. (Griaule 1965, 44) Of course, some Dogon might maintain a set of beliefs closer to that subsequently described in
The Pale Fox, while others might ascribe to the truncated version found in Forde's African Worlds. (Griaule & Dieterlen 1986 & 1954 . . . ripped off a piece of placenta which became the Earth. Then, in search of his twin sister, he penetrated the Earth, thereby committing an act of incest. The placenta rotted (the origin of death) and the Earth became impure. (Pataux 2004, 8-9) 1 Death and disorder having been introduced into the system, the remaining twin, Nommo, goes about attempting to maintain order as the ancestors appear, followed by humans, the basics of classification that customers now are asking for Zinfandel, Gamay, or Sauvignon, even though the wine may hail from Bordeaux?" (Douglas 1986, 102) In the beginning, to make a long story short, American wine-drinkers were interested in drinking wines that were like the wines they already enjoyed. Carlo Rossi, a jug wine label of the E. & J. Gallo Company, still markets Chablis, Burgundy, Chianti, and Sangria, but nobody expects them to taste much like the classic wines and wine drinks of France, Italy, or Spain. But when the high-end California vintners of the 1960s attempted to challenge their European competitors, it turned out that "the chateau and regional names could not be attached to wines in California without violating a property right."(ibid., 106) The grape names, on the other hand, can not be trademarked, and so if you want to market a wine in the style of a great Bordeaux -say Chateau Lafite or Chateau Latouryou use at least 70% cabernet sauvignon. Unless you're trying for a Chateau Petrus, which is 95% merlot. Chablis is traditionally made from chardonnay, while Chianti is primarily sangiovese, and so on. As American wines began to compete successfully, the grape became the The French, of course, are committed to their heritage, and so we get helpful websites such as thekitchn.com posting tips on reading French wine labels, including principal grapes and styles, and noting that, "Alsace is the one region that consistently (and thankfully!) varietally labels its wines."(http://www.thekitchn.com/how-to-read-a-french-wine-label-202068) Of course, things work more slowly, usually, in an oral culture lacking advertising agencies and mass media, but Douglas's picture remains the same. Someone comes to a teacher with a question about religious practice. The teacher gives an answer and the client asks for further explanation. The teacher expands on a story or a theme, perhaps in the way his teacher did for him, and the next thing you know you've got midrash.
Van Beek may not have set out to discredit Griaule and Dieterlen, though his subsequent talk about, "how to demolish someone's lifework in a respectful way," reveals something of his academic ambitions. (van Beek 2004, 60) What he doesn't do is take seriously the narrative structure of Conversations with Ogotemmeli. Written in the style of a mystery novel, the "European" is Griaule in character, not unlike Dante in the Comedia. The book opens with the European on his verandah, where:
A European was continuing an enquiry, begun the day before, into a mysterious sacrifice which had taken place in a cleft in the Gorge of I . . . An elderly Dogon was giving scraps of information in reply to his questions, reluctantly surrendering the bare bones of the truth, now going back on what he had said before, now proffering lies, smiling or abashed, but resolutely clinging to his mysteries. (Griaule 1965, 7) The narrator then scans the house, revealing "a young European woman" doing linguistic research into Dogon dialects, another "European woman who was at once patient and persistent," and "another white woman" collecting prayer texts from "a bright-eyed Bambara." At this point "a novelty" appears in "the person of Gana, son of the Hogon, the oldest man, and consequently the religious chief, of Ogol." This latter announces that "A hunter wishes to see you." (ibid., 7-8) This is Griaule's introduction to Ogotemmeli, the blind and aged hunter, who "wished to pass on to the foreigner, who had first visited the country fifteen years before, and whom he trusted, the instructions which he himself had received first from his grandfather and later from his father."(ibid., 13) The narrator notes that after his blinding he devoted himself to the accumulation of knowledge "of nature, of animals, of men and of gods . . . People came to his door for advice every day and even by night."(ibid., 15)
Griaule the narrator, sets the European as character in the role of ingenu, being introduced to the symbolic system by a single informant, perhaps under the instruction of the religious chief of the village. Given that this would seem to violate the precepts Griaule taught at the Sorbonne, from 1942 until his death, the reader should be surprised from the beginning.(see Griaule 1957, 54-64 reviewing a new edition in the same venue, writes that "the reader has to work hard to extract significant food for thought," but goes on note that "this is a pity, because at the heart of this book is a human predicament of compelling interest." (Willis 1982, 797) Willis discerns, underneath Leiris's tedious self-absorption, the desire to "discover his own humanity," in the life of Africa, but finds this impossible because of his status as European scientist, a "quandary . . . that many anthropologists will find only too familiar."(ibid., 798) I am inclined to imagine that despite being offended, Griaule saw this as well, and took it as a challenge. The European ingenu of Conversations, unlike Leiris, manages to do science at the same time that, in the manner of Dante's lead character, he discovers himself.
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The Pale Fox, on the other hand, begins by laying out the informants, along with "the names of the tribe or caste to which they belong . . . as well as the area where they live." (Griaule and Dieterlen 1986, 21) This is closer to Griaule's norm.(see Clifford 1983, 137ff ) Given the plurality of voices, it is not surprising that a more confusing and conflicting mythology emerges. The young boys in that picture seem to favor western-style t-shirts with collars, though the masks don't appear to have changed since the time of Griaule.(ibid., [87] [88] [89] [90] [91] [144] [145] [146] [151] [152] [153] But that would be premature. Those same young men who work in the cities, "return with enthusiasm for important mask ceremonies taking place in their home villages yet reinvent masks in terms of urban novelty." Among the various innovations Richards observed include a headpiece "bedecked with pill packets and recycled monosodium glutamate wrappers, its tresses sparkling with cut-up strips of sardine cans." This "is a continuation of the existing tradition of beautification that provokes no objection among local consumers.: (Richards 2005, 51) At the same time, many Dogon maintain that the masks contain the vital force, nyama. This force can be more or less powerful, depending on the situation. Consequently, women unaware of the power were coming too close and, according to her informant, "becoming mad . . . so were tourists." (Richards 2006, 96) In short, despite "the enormous divergence of belief and practice among a people whose 'culture' is anything but homogenous,"(ibid., 94) those beliefs and practices are interpretable because they are connected to a shared world. Despite the complex flux of Dogon belief and practice, some among them believe that if the vital force of a mask, imina, is not fixed in a way that controls its power, it remains dangerous and bad things are likely to happen. And even if contained, it may be used to powerful ends. To draw on another of Richards's informants, "if a man has committed a bad crime against imina, the men of the village will mask up and surround the wall enclosing the yard of that man. They will utter the mask cry 'Hun' three times and will push against the wall. At that moment the nyama of the masks will be transferred onto the criminal. Within three years he will die."(ibid, 97) And "within three years he will die," is true if and only if within three years he dies. What else could the informant mean?
The ethnographer learns to communicate with her subject through the same process of triangulation by which her subjects come to communicate with each other, which is the same process by which infants are trained into the linguistic community. "It is the result," as Davidson puts it, "of a threefold interaction, an interaction which is twofold from the point of view of each of the two agents: each is interacting simultaneously with the world and with the other agent." (Davidson 1997a, 128) 
Religion, "God," and Meaning
In an essay from 2002, Terry Godlove seems to reach much the same position about understanding religion, concluding that, "while students of religion need not believe in God, we do need to believe in belief." (Godlove 2002, 24) In a very neat argument against those who would dismiss "belief" as a useful concept in the study of religions, Godlove maintains that:
Shoulder to shoulder with the new materialists, the radical interpreter also embraces the causal, material circumstances of speech and action; indeed, the argument from natural history requires her to weave them into the very fabric of meaning. Those in religious studies looking for an interpretive stance from which to integrate the material and the mental will find one in Davidson's account of radical interpretation. (ibid., 20) This seems to make one with the combination of history, sociology, and ethnography I have been deploying to make sense of the Dogon. 2 But in recent work, Godlove seems to be moving away from Davidson and toward a position that I think has puzzling consequences.
In Kant and the Meaning of Religion, Godlove adopts Robert Brandom's distinction between "weak," "strong," and "hyperinferentialism." For Brandom, "conceptual content" is a function of the inferential role a piece of language plays in a particular discourse, as opposed to 19 its role in "the representation of states of affairs." (Brandom 1994, 130) Strong inferentialism maintains that "broadly inferential articulation is sufficient for specifically conceptual contentfulness -that is, that there is nothing more to conceptual content than its broadly inferential articulation."(ibid, 131) Hyperinferentialism, on the other hand, "would allow only inferential circumstances and consequences of application. Under such a restriction it is impossible to reconstruct the contents of actual concepts, except perhaps in some regions of mathematics."(ibid., 131-132) The difference between "broad" and "narrow" Brandom develops from Michael Dummett, who writes that, "learning to use a statement of a given form involves, then, learning two things: the conditions under which one is justified in making the statements and what constitutes acceptance of it, i.e., the consequences of accepting it."(ibid., 118) Among the Dogon, "That is a dugugi-yena," is introduced to young girls in the context of explaining the "sisters of the masks," which in turn is introduced as part of learning about masks and their powers and why women are typically not allowed to watch the masks. This is crucial because "the link between pragmatic significance and inferential content is supplied by the fact that asserting a sentence is (among other things) implicitly undertaking a commitment to the correctness of the material inference from its circumstances to its consequences of application."(ibid.) Thus, once the woman has assimilated this part of the language it is natural that on seeing the woman with the dugugi-yena she step away fearfully so as to avoid potentially negative consequences.
Godlove seems to take this further. He claims that Kant is, "an early, and probably the first, proponent of a strongly inferentialist view of conceptual content," and that the first Critique is "directed against what Brandom is calling hyperinflationism: Absent legitimate application to the world, our concepts are meaningless." (Godlove 2014, 28) 20
When he gets to the illustrating this, however, he borrows Michael Williams's notion of an EMU: "explanation of meaning in terms of use."(ibid., 153) The EMU comprises an I-clause, which stipulates the inferential moves connected to a term, an E-clause, introducing the epistemic conditions that license using the term, and an F-clause, providing the point of using the term. Thus, to use an example Williams takes from Brandom, who takes it from Sellars, "(I-R)
The inference from 'x is red' to 'x is not green', 'x is not yellow', etc. is always good, i.e., necessarily, if x is monochromatically red, x is not monochromatically green (yellow, etc.)"
The E-clause becomes, "(1) The inferential moves specified by (I-R) are free. (2) If the speaker has a reliable discriminative reporting disposition (RDRD) -a disposition, given appropriate motivation and conditions, to report 'x is red' only in the presence of a red thing in his field of vision -'red' has a reporting use." Finally, the F-clause tells us that, "In a reporting use, tokens of 'x is red' express reliable discriminative reactions to an environmental circumstance. In this way, they function as language-entry transitions, and thereby play a distinguished role in securing/undermining 'theoretical' entitlements." (Williams 2010, 326 ) Thus E-and F-clauses capture Brandom's "broadly inferential articulation," as opposed to the narrow articulation of "hyperinferentialism." And Williams's approach help illustrates the limits of hyperinferentialism. If you limit yourself exclusively to the I-clause, then the concepts you introduce may be consistent with each other and complete, but they will have no role to play in language-entry reports about the world around us.
It's important to remind ourselves, however, that EMUs are not definitions. They introduce us to the conditions and consequences of introducing a term into our discourse.
For when Godlove subjects Kant's notion of "the abstract God" to the EMU model, he seems to be going beyond what Williams intends:
I-G(A):
The concept of God (the Transcendental Ideal, the highest being, ens summum) is that of the complete determination of all positive predicates -"the idea of a being which includes in itself all reality"(A578/B606) That is, from any positive predicate inferential links to all other possible positive predicates are always freeare always legitimate all at once. This is not a possible cognition for finite intellects.
E-G(A):
It "cannot be objectively given and be itself such a thing. Such a thing is a mere fiction"(eine blosse Erdichtung, A580/B608). It is not a formal condition of experience and so neither an empirical warrant nor a transcendental deduction is available.
F-G(A):
The failure of the I and E-clauses means that this concept cannot figure in empirical judgment, and so the point of having it cannot be to pick out a feature of the world. (Godlove 2014, 158-159) And here's the puzzle. Williams doesn't present us with an account of how an EMU-clause fails, thus when Godlove write that "this is not a possible cognition for finite intellects," it's unclear whether this is part of the I-clause or a judgment upon it. If we focus just on the second sentence, we would seem to have something like "tree, therefore God," "bug, therefore God," "Charles Manson, therefore God," etc. We could, I suppose, join these claims with the conjunction, terminating in the "etc." If there are an infinite number of wellformed sentences that can be constructed using conjunction, then the "etc." just indicates that we could go on forever, but never complete them all at once. But that's no big deal.
As for the E-clause, I confess that I've never been sure exactly what a transcendental deduction is supposed to be, but I don't see why the believer cannot take some event as a warrant for saying "I see God's handiwork in that." Suppose, for example, my girlfriend is a
Reformed Jew of the typical California sort -not observant, culturally Jewish, with a willingness to use a broadly religious vocabulary -and we've hiked up the cliff above San
Gregorio about a quarter to eight. Over the course of the next 18 minutes the sun will descend into the Pacific and the green-gray waters will turn a shimmering blood-orange and gold. If she says, "I see God's handiwork in that," I might ask if she's just being metaphorical, but she doesn't have to be. I don't believe in God, but why cause a stink?
And On the other hand, there seems to be a project of Godlove's own, one that goes beyond the exegesis of Kant. It may well be the case that, on Kant's own terms, his account of the abstract God is incoherent, and that Kant's point was to demonstrate that incoherence.
Godlove takes it a step further and claims that, "talk that had seemed to be about God turns out, on inspection, to be, literally, about us. Kant is inviting us to look beyond the bogus content of the concept at stake, and instead to ask after what it might yet be good for. A portentous invitation at the dawn of the social sciences."(ibid., 160) This seems to argue that Kant's critique of his own abstract account of God should apply to any and every account of
God, but it is unclear why this should be. Wolterstorff might admit that he does not have a complete account of God, but that the God of which he speaks is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, as encountered first and foremost in the Christian Bible. With regard to that God, Wolterstorff has worked out some pretty complicated inferential relations:
On the assumption that Jesus was speaking on behalf of God, it is toward God that his disciples have a duty to forgive those who wrong them, not toward those who wrong them. And it is God who has a right against them, not the malefactors, to their forgiving the malefactors. I suggest that duties of charity in general are third-party duties. Our principle of correlatives remains unscathed. Moral obligations do not outrun rights. (Wolterstorff 2008, 384) It is open to anyone to disagree with Wolterstorff, not only about the existence of God, but about the primacy of rights talk in understanding justice, but if you accept either of those positions, he seems to have done a masterful job of "tracking the inferential connections between the circumstances of appropriate application and between the appropriate consequences of application."(Godlove 2014, 163)
From Midrash to Metaphysics
Assuming that Godlove does want to make the larger philosophical argument about religious language in general, why might he have doubts about the legitimacy of Wolterstorff's project? It may be, in part, because he, like Kant, "is aiming his critique at a scholastic tradition in philosophical theology,"(ibid., 160) rather than religion as a lived human institution. "The sheer abstractness," he writes, "of the ens summum makes it hard to think of this God as requiring some definite mode of human conduct." ( propositions to actions, and Rorty hopes to drive a wedge between the two. "The best way to make Tillich and fuzziness look good, and to make creeds look bad," he writes, "is to emphasize the similarity between having faith in God and being in love with another human being."(ibid.) This, Rorty hopes, will go some way to knocking the wind out gay-bashing and crusades.
Godlove, however, seems drawn to a view something like MacIntyre's, in which the progress of western science, the fragmentation of religious solidarities, and the pressure of modern capitalism almost inevitably put pressure on those who would be both religious and 25 modern to evacuate meaning from religious belief in the quest for eirenic liberal pluralism. I imagine that Godlove and I would both be happy to embrace such a pluralism, but I suspect that we are, at the same time, wedded to contrasting academic commitments. When he writes that Kant's critique of "the bogus content of the concept" amounts to "a portentous invitation at the dawn of the social sciences,"(Godlove 2014, 160) he enters the lists in an ongoing debate on approaches to the study of religion. In the earlier article, Godlove was at pains to sustain the importance of belief in the study of religion. (Godlove 2002, 20-24) But at the same time, he hopes to discredit those protectionist strategies that attempt to shield religion and religious believers from naturalist critiques. So when he hits upon a way of reading Kant, the supposed defender of faith, in a way in which "talk that had seemed to be In 2000, as I sat beneath a shelter awaiting the afternoon dama celebrations at Amani, a group of young boys, aged around eight or so, where chattering next to me about the fact that they knew that the masks were men. An elder dozing on a rock nearby overheard and asked the question "imina tiritiri?" (Do the masks speak?"). The elder then fiercely objected to the children's discussion: "Masks don't speak, therefore they cannot be men." (Richards 2006, 101) This combines both a basic argument against the position held by the boys and displays the threat of authority. But when the boys undertake initiation, they will receive the basic account of the origins and functions of the masks, the sort of thing van Beek suggests is Moody, whose response to obscure biblical passages ran:
People say, "What do you do with what you cannot understand?" "I don't do anything with it." "How do you understand it?" "I don't understand it." "Well, how do you interpret it?" "I don't interpret it" . . . "Do you believe it?" "Yes, I believe it." Of course I do. I am glad that there is a height I know nothing about in the old book, a length and a breadth we know nothing about. It makes the book all the fascinating. I thank God it is beyond me. It is a pretty good proof that it came from God, and not from the hand of man. (Hutchison 2003, 143) Twenty years later The Fundamentals would begin appearing, reflecting Moody's "simple, noncombative assertiveness,"(ibid., 144) but ultimately lending a name to a very combative movement that not only survived the setback of the 1920s, but persists as part of an 29 "evangelical subculture" that "is broad and deep in the United States." (Balmer 2014, 357) The nice thing about biblical inerrancy is that it leaves very little to doubt in its inferential relations. The apologetic philosopher of religion can content himself with the classic arguments and with debunking the classic criticism.(see Craig & Sinnott-Armstrong 2004) Godlove and I probably agree that faith as ultimate concern, the catch-phrase commonly associated with Tillich, is vapid, at best, though it's worth being reminded that Tillich was preaching the sovereignty of God in the face of human sovereigns preparing for massive, unchecked, war. (Hutchison 2003, 162-165) In any case, the believer in biblical inerrancy is free to agree that Tillich's theology strays too far from biblical truth without changing an iota of his beliefs. He can happily admit that even the most orthodox theologian is merely an interpreter of biblical truth and reaffirm that in some cases it is both wise and humble to follow Moody in thanking God that some biblical passage are "beyond" him.
As in the case of the Dogon, rationality is local. By this I mean that there is no universal standard of rationality. What's reasonable for one group to do in their particular natural and intellectual environment is a function of the standards on the ground. Thus, when Henry of Livonia reports that the Baltic pagans "thought that since they had been baptized with water, they could remove their baptism by washing themselves in the Dvina and thus send it back to Germany," he is ridiculing their superstition, even though he reports with pious certainty on the very next page that when Brother Theodoric "died a certain convert saw his soul being carried into heaven by the angels and recognized him from a distance of seven miles." (Henry of Livonia 1961, 27-28) Belief in the superstition of others goes hand in hand with belief in a god of miracles.
It may seem that I am making it hard for anyone to be irrational, but in fact it is hard to be irrational, for reasons captured by Davidson. In the language of Davidson, we would be inclined to label someone irrational if we regularly failed to assign reasons to many of his actions, but this would mean either that he didn't act on reasons or that the reasons he did
give were not simply mistaken, but made it dramatically difficult to negotiate day to day activities. If I mis-identify a Mercedes as a Maserati it's no big deal. If I regularly misidentify my Mazda 3 for a Dodge Ram Laramie Longhorn, try to start it, call a cat for a tow when my key doesn't work, and the like, it will become more and more difficult to understand my behavior. That's irrationality. We have words for some sorts of "maladaptive patterns" of behavior, and their exact natures are regularly debated before the appearance of each new edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association. To think the world is other than it is, and to shape your behavior to conform to those false beliefs, is a receipt for frustration. But isolating individual propositions which we do not find compelling and then labeling those who would accept them irrational is intellectually unfair.
Conclusion
I hoped to do several things in this essay. First, I think it is important, in discussing Donald Davidson, to be mindful of the ways, particularly later in his career, of the interrelations language, intention, and rationality. By the end of the 1980s, Davidson had ceased to view Tarski as providing a "theory" of meaning. Instead, the Aristotelian characterization of truth from which Tarski takes his cue tells us all we need to know about the relation between truth and language. To the extent that we can formulate the truth conditions for a natural language along the lines Tarski elaborates for formal languages, we 31 can learn more than any theory of meaning can provide about inferential relations. It is the ability to triangulate the behavior of others in a shared world that leads us to believe they are rational, that they are using language, and that we can translate their language.
Equipped with this approach to meaning, I turned to the Dogon of Mali to illustrate it in action. Drawing particularly on the work of Polly Richards, I put on display the ways that what Dogon say and do allows us to attribute to them certain beliefs about the way the world is, its dangers and enticements. In the process, we accumulated evidence that different that it dovetails well with that of Davidson, and expressed some worries that his application
